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Abstract
In modern times, Aristotelian influence on Islamicate philosophical writing is exaggerated. Al-Fārābī
did more than just copy Aristotle, he was an original thinker, and he may have sourced aspects of
his thought and writing style from the Qurʾān. Consideration of al-Fārābī’s biography, works and
historical context demonstrates his disinclination to base his writings on those of Aristotle. AlFārābī’s thoughts in the key area of revelation in al-Madīna al-fāḍila demonstrate his departure
from ancient Greek belief in this area, although his use of individual reasoning also shows clearly
his occasional disagreement with Islamic doctrine. Differences and commonalities between animals
and humans as written by al-Fārābī can be compared with Aristotle’s dissimilar thoughts on these
matters, refuting the idea that al-Fārābī was simply an Aristotelian philosopher. Use of the religious
term fiṭra in al-Madīna al-fāḍila is a microcosm of its writer’s propensity to include the terminology
of revealed religion in this book.

Transliterations of Arabic follow the International Journal of Middle East Studies system with the
sole exception that the definite article preceding sun letters is transliterated how it is pronounced;
Greek transliterations follow the Pennsylvania State University system.
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Chapter One: Introduction and Background
Introduction
How humans are related to animals is an important question which some notable philosophers
have attempted to tackle, whether generally or in a specifically political context. Perhaps more
important still is the question of how God interacts with and commands humans. Abū Naṣr alFārābī (c.260-c.340AH)1 wrote about these themes in his Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila
(variously translated as On the Perfect State, Principles of the Views of the People of the Perfect
State, etc., henceforth al-Madīna al-Fāḍila). Much has been made in books about Islamicate
philosophy written in European languages of the dominating influence of ancient knowledge –
usually Greek but also Persian, Pharaonic and other sources – on the scholarly culture of mediaeval
Islamicate societies.
This study, which focusses specifically on elements of one work of al-Fārābī in particular, does not
aim to reject this idea entirely, rather simply to stress in addition to it the importance of other
influences, notably in this case the Noble Qurʾān as well as al-Fārābī’s original thinking, although
the latter may have been unintentional.2 Analysis of key sections of al-Madīna al-fāḍila is the
central key to achieving this. Such an analysis gives us the basis to evaluate the ideas, methodology
and style of al-Fārābī, backing up any tentative conclusions with specific evidence from primary
sources.
We can use a detailed knowledge of al-Madīna al-fāḍila to demonstrate or suggest that al-Fārābī
did not simply copy Aristotle – he had his own unique ideas about animals, humans and God and
their natures or Nature, and moreover he used many of the ideas inherent in his Muslim faith.

1

All dates except the publications of modern books are AH unless otherwise specified.
For the question of al-Fārābī’s thought being unintentional, see the discussion of the transmission of the
texts of Aristotle’s works on animals, below pp20-22.
2

4

Replacing or downplaying the influence of Aristotle in some areas of al-Fārābī’s oeuvre has the
potential to alter how we understand al-Fārābī, and perhaps how we understand Islamicate
philosophy as a whole.
The scope of this thesis is broad, but manageable. A highly detailed commentary on the whole of
al-Madīna al-fāḍila would be impossible given the space available, as well as undesirable firstly
because al-Fārābī describes such a wide variety of subjects which are often only tenuously related
to one another and secondly because of the sheer length of al-Madīna al-Fāḍila. This ideologically
dense book of about 145 pages is the mature work3 of al-Fārābī – he details in it his views on many
aspects of philosophy, making it impossible for us to analyse in detail every section of this book, not
to mention that some often-discussed topics such as the specific characteristics of flawed states are
not particularly relevant to this study. It will be argued that, broadly speaking, al-Fārābī has been
misunderstood – Aristotle’s influence on him is not as important as is often claimed in secondary
sources, and the significance of religion has largely been ignored in these sources. Updating and
emending the notion of the centrality of Peripatetic ideas, adding the importance of al-Fārābī’s
originality and the influence of his faith, would allow us to understand al-Fārābī’s work quite
differently.4
The main reason for selecting animal-human relationships and revelation as areas of focus is that
even though these topics are sometimes referred to in passing as being areas of commonality
between Aristotle and al-Fārābī,5 no critical study has yet examined them in detail. Commentaries
on al-Fārābī’s works can be prone to taking the Aristotelian paradigm for granted, but here we have

3

See “Al-Fārābī’s Biography, Oeuvre and Scholarly Milieu” below.
Especially the recondite Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma which discusses gnosis. Understanding this and other works from
the point of view of specifically Islamic philosophy, as opposed to Islamicate philosophy dominated by
Aristotle’s influence, could shed new light on the meanings of al-Fārābī’s ideas. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma could be
recategorised as a sort of Sufi or mystical text.
5
Walzer (see below, pp6-7) cites Aristotle’s works on animals, notably On the Generation of Animals,
extensively in his commentary on al-Madīna al-fāḍila, for example. He claims (1998 pp398ff.) that al-Fārābī
bases chapter 12 of al-Madīna al-fāḍila on Aristotle’s On the Generation of Animals, presupposing that an
accurate, comprehensive edition of Aristotle’s psychological and biological writings was used by al-Fārābī.
4

5

the opportunity to examine critically to what extent al-Fārābī was influenced by Aristotle’s works
on animals in an attempt to demonstrate the excessive emphasis placed by modern scholars on his
influences from Peripatetic ideas.
In light of the fact that so much contemporary literature on Islamicate philosophy takes the
Aristotelian pattern for granted, the focus of this thesis is the primary sources, foremost among
them al-Madīna al-fāḍila. This study aims to identify what the text itself says, challenging this
common idea that Aristotle was the main influence on al-Fārābī and opening up hitherto neglected
aspects of his philosophy. Al-Fārābī lived in a polyglot, multicultural and religiously diverse society.
While he discussed a considerable variety of issues even in al-Madīna al-fāḍila itself, some of the
most important of these are related to the practical application of rationalism within revealed
religion and, by extension, how society ought to interpret and use the rules and guidelines of
revealed religion. Updating and emending existing ideas about al-Madīna al-fāḍila and al-Fārābī’s
oeuvre more generally can shed light on ancient solutions to problems which continue to be
relevant in the modern world.

Sources and Methodology
The text of al-Madīna al-fāḍila which has been used is Richard Walzer’s critical edition, On the
Perfect State, originally published in 1985 and reprinted in 1998.6 This edition of the text has been
written using a complete corpus of ten manuscripts which date from 468AH to the thirteenth
century of the Hijra.7 Walzer has preserved the chapter and paragraph divisions which are present
in the earliest extant manuscripts, and I have followed this same system in referencing his edition.
With regard to diacritics, these generally follow the text as found in Walzer’s edition except in some

6

Walzer, R. (ed.), 1998, On the Perfect State (KAZI Publications, Chicago) – first published by Oxford
University Press in 1985.
7
See Walzer 1998 pp19ff “The evidence for the text” for a detailed description of the editor’s apparatus
criticus.
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quotations where diacritics have been inserted into words whose significations could be
ambiguous.
An extensive body of secondary literature on al-Fārābī and his works exists in both Arabic and
European languages. Some of these books are useful for this current study, and some are not –
most of them are not specific to the interrelation of animals and humans or revelation in al-Fārābī’s
philosophy, rather the Active Intellect is often the main focus. Walzer often cites Aristotle’s On the
Generation of Animals in his commentary on al-Madīna al-fāḍila, but he seldom goes into detail
about how al-Fārābī used it as a source. The best general overview of Farabism is Ian Richard
Netton’s Al-Fārābī and his School, which we will have cause to cite to support some general points.
Richard Walzer, the German-born British expert on ancient and mediaeval philosophy, was perhaps
the most notable exponent of the pride of place supposedly given to ancient philosophy by alFārābī. Walzer’s outstanding work on al-Fārābī in various areas being well-known8 and without
trying to criticise his approach, we should attempt to update his views and broaden our
understanding of al-Fārābī’s work by placing greater emphasis on the variety of different origins of
the ideas in al-Madīna al-fāḍila - notably Islamic thought and belief, which Walzer does not
consider in detail in his works on al-Fārābī.
Ulrich Rudolph’s chapter “Reflections on al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila”9 is one of
the most important secondary sources which inspired this thesis. Rudolph adopts a similar
methodology to that used here, namely focussing specifically on the text of al-Madīna al-fāḍila
itself, but he concludes that Islamic beliefs and principles are so centrally important in this book
that it ought to be viewed as a sort of Islamic theological work.

8

See bibliography. His 1998 critical edition of al-Madīna al-fāḍila is especially notable, but one should also
cite Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic Philosophy, a collection of essays published in 1962 on many
different themes and authors within Islamic philosophy.
9
Published in Adamson, P. (ed.), 2008, In the Age of al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century
(The Warburg Institute).
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Christopher Colmo aimed in his book Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder to demonstrate the
originality of al-Fārābī, while at the same time remembering that al-Fārābī acknowledged that he
benefited from reading the political philosophy of Plato. The premise of this source, that the
subject was an original thinker, is supported by good evidence from his books. Joep Lameer’s AlFārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics, published in 1994, is also a useful source for apprehending
recent developments in scholarly understanding of the various technical terms used by al-Fārābī
and the relationship between religion, logic and philosophy in al-Madīna al-fāḍila particularly.
Sources dealing specifically with human-animal relationships in al-Fārābī are somewhat harder to
find. Georgios Steiris’ pioneering chapter “Isidore of Seville and al-Fārābi on Animals: Ontology and
Ethics” (published in Animal Ethics: Past and Present Perspectives) approached the question of alFārābī’s attitude towards the nature of animals and how it differs from that of humans by
comparing it with that of St Isidore of Seville and looking for precedents in ancient Hellenistic
philosophy. This informative chapter by Steiris demonstrates a firm command of source material,
but here we have the luxury of relatively plentiful space in which to conduct detailed analyses of
key sections from the primary text of al-Fārābī.
Even though a general awareness of the state of scholarship on al-Fārābī until now is informative
for this thesis, and even though too a specific knowledge of certain notably relevant articles is
required, we should still look at secondary sources critically. Sometimes the methodology and
conclusions of its authors can leave something to be desired – analysis of key sections of al-Madīna
al-fāḍila has to be our main focus. It would be a mistake for various reasons to attempt to attack
modern scholars who assert the dominance of Aristotelian ideas in al-Fārābī’s thought. Instead we
can update what writers such as Walzer have suggested, playing down to some extent Aristotle’s
importance and stressing the equal role of original thought, however unintentional it might have
been, and ideas based on the religion of Islam.

8

When we are confronted with such a knotty problem as the various influences of al-Fārābī, the first
thing to be done is to return to the primary texts, mainly al-Madīna al-fāḍila, and try to glean what
we can from an analysis of these. Only then can we turn to secondary literature. Where
biographical details about al-Fārābī are relevant, generally these have been taken from mediaeval
biographical dictionaries, as noted below,10 as well as the Encyclopaedia of Islam.11
Limited use of Aristotle’s books is important for demonstrating al-Fārābī’s inclination to disagree
with him at times. On the Soul,12 Nicomachean Ethics13 and Metaphysics are the most important of
Aristotle’s books for us, and they were main sources for his writings in the mediaeval Islamicate
world. Passages from Aristotle are cited according to the systems used in the printed editions of
these books and the original text is given in footnotes.

Al-Fārābī’s Biography, Oeuvre and Scholarly Milieu
Biography of al-Fārābī
Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Fārābī14 (c.260-340) was a Muslim philosopher of central
Asian origin who spent most of his life in Baghdad and the Levant. He may have travelled to Egypt
in 338.15 Nothing is known for certain about the biography of al-Fārābī beyond the basics – he did
not write an autobiography per se, and none of his students wrote his biography either – but we
can suggest that Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila is probably the latest of his extant works on
philosophy.16

10

p11n25. See also Bibliography.
EI “al Fārābī”; “Falsafa”.
12
Peri Psychēs in Greek, or De Anima in Latin.
13
Or Ethica Nicomachea in Latin.
14
The names of al-Fārābī’s grandfather and great-grandfather are not found in the earliest sources. Ibn Abī
Uṣaybiʿa calls him Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Awzalagh ibn Ṭarkhān al-Fārābī. Another
possibility is Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭarkhān ibn Awzalagh al-Fārābī at-Turkī, as he is
called by Ibn Khallikān, however this final nisba is not attested elsewhere.
15
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa p603
16
Ibid. p605; Walzer 1998 p20.
11
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Al-Fārābī wrote extensively on many topics within philosophy, and was also highly knowledgeable
about mathematics, musical theory and medicine. He knew at least some Greek, which would have
allowed him access to the original texts of Aristotle where they were available,17 however given the
paucity of sources for al-Fārābī’s life, we have no information about his efforts at translation, if
any.18
Al-Fārābī studied logic with Yūḥannā ibn Ḥaylān. This was probably in Baghdad, where Yūḥannā
died during the Caliphate of al-Muqtadir.19 Al-Fārābī continued his work in philosophy with Yaḥyā
ibn ʿAdiyy. The former was in Baghdad until the end of 330. He started to write al-Madīna al-fāḍila
while still there, and took the work in progress with him to Damascus, where he finished it in 331.
He may have added six sections summarising al-Madīna al-fāḍila during his possible visit to Egypt in
338. Biographers mostly agree that he died in Damascus around 340.20
Although the question of al-Fārābī’s ethnic origin has been debated extensively,21 it is not relevant
for our purposes here. Whether he was ethnically Persian or Turkish does not change what he
wrote or how we ought to interpret it. Indeed, we can suggest that, owing to the lack of reliable
information about his life, debating this point is ultimately a fruitless exercise.22 Most details about
al-Fārābī’s life and death found in one source are directly contradicted by at least one other. Ṣāʿid
al-Andalusī (d. 462) was the first biographer to dedicate a whole entry to al-Fārābī,23 summarising
some of his books and adding the information that he was associated with the Hamdanid ruler Sayf
ad-Dawla.

17

Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa p604
None of the mediaeval biographers give us any information about al-Fārābī’s translations of ancient Greek
texts, and modern scholars such as Walzer assume that he read such books as translations produced by
others.
19
Al- Masʿūdī p122
20
Al-Masʿūdī, writing less than ten years after the fact, states that he died in Rajab 339. Other biographers
give a date of either 339 or 340 in Damascus, but ash-Shahrazūrī states that he was mugged and killed on the
road to Ascalon without giving a date (Nuzhat al-arwāḥ p301).
21
Walzer 1998 p2; Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ i. Biography”; etc.
22
Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ i. Biography”.
23
Ṭabaqāt al-umam pp53-54
18
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The main reason for stressing Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa’s account of al-Fārābī’s life and works is that he
quotes a rare autobiographical passage in which al-Fārābī gives a tendentious account of the
history of philosophy and specifically logic from ancient times until his age.24 While we can certainly
call into question some aspects of the historical narrative presented by al-Fārābī, there is no
specific reason to doubt the autobiographical information which the biographer quotes. Moreover,
the inclusion of this passage in ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ does seem to demonstrate that
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa had access to primary sources about the life of al-Fārābī, even though some other
aspects of his account are more myth than historical fact.
Understanding how biographers, especially Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī, al-Masʿūdī, ashShahrazūrī and Ibn Khallikān,25 wrote about the life of al-Fārābī provides an essential context for
understanding, in turn, his work itself. Of equal importance for this thesis, however, it also
demonstrates clearly what his main areas of interest were. It is stated repeatedly and
unambiguously in all of these biographies that al-Fārābī was a practising Muslim26 – there is no
sense that he apostatised or denied that the Qurʾān is a genuine, authoritative religious text. This
supports what we can discover by means of a thorough, careful reading of relevant passages
written by al-Fārābī himself.
Al-Fārābī’s works
The Farabian corpus is vast in scope, making it impossible to cover all of al-Fārābī’s work here,
however we can briefly describe some of the other important works of al-Fārābī, looking at how alMadīna al-fāḍila fits into his oeuvre. About 150 works of varying length are attributed to al-Fārābī,
not all of which are extant.27

24

p604
In their books ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, Ṭabaqāt al-umam, at-Tanbīh wa’l-ashrāf, Nuzhat alarwāḥ wa-rawḍat al-afrāḥ fī tārīkh al-ḥukamāʾ and Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-ʾanbāʾ abnāʾ az-zamān respectively.
26
Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī actually introduces al-Fārābī as faylsūf al-muslimīn “the philosopher of the Muslims” p53.
27
Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ v. Music”.
25
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No critical study of the surviving manuscripts of these works generally has yet been undertaken –
this significant task for the future would have to name repeated listings under different titles and
possible misattributions, as well as any double listings of the same books in Arabic and Persian.28
Although Steinscheider was the first to make a critical appraisal of al-Fārābī’s biography, he did not
research the manuscript history of his works.29 Detailed studies of the transmissions of individual
books are also tasks for the future, except in the case of al-Madīna al-fāḍila, the transmission of
which was analysed by Muhsin Mahdi in 1990 and Richard Walzer in his critical edition On the
Perfect State.
Many of al-Fārābī’s extant writings deal at least in part with logic and linguistic philosophy. Many of
these logical writings are, in turn, commentaries on works of ancient Greek-speaking philosophers
such as Aristotle and Porphyry, but al-Fārābī did also write some independent works on logic and
the philosophy of language. These include Kitāb al-ḥurūf and parts of Kitāb at-tanbīh ʿalā sabīl assaʿāda.30 Other works such as Kitāb al-wāḥid wa’l-waḥda deal primarily with metaphysics. AsSīyāsa al-madanīyya is called an “emanationist” text by Druart.31 Al-Fārābī wrote eight works on
music, of which four are extant, the most significant of these being Kitāb al-mūṣīqā al-kabīr.
Political philosophy is discussed in several of al-Fārābī’s works, but it is not the main subject of any
of them. Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿulūm and Kitāb at-tanbīh ʿalā sabīl as-saʿāda as well as al-Madīna al-fāḍila are
rather difficult to categorise definitively because they cover a wide variety of different topics,
without focussing on any specific one of them.
Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma is perhaps the most recondite of all of al-Fārābī’s books, and also perhaps the most
controversial of his major works in its attribution, because in modern times it is sometimes claimed

28

For example, the various titles given to Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma, as noted by Corbin p159.
See bibliography.
30
The latter was edited by Jaʿfar Āl Yāsīn and published by Hekmat Publications (Iran) in 1371AH.
31
Encyclopædia Iranica “FĀRĀBĪ iii. Metaphysics”.
29
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to have been written by Ibn Sīnā.32 This highly enigmatic text deals with conventional philosophy as
well as gnosis, and also introduces a new concept in philosophy, being the real difference between
existence and essence in created beings. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma represents a possible result of this
research: if dominating Aristotelian influence on al-Fārābī were to be disproven, it is likely that we
would view Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma quite differently, perhaps more like the mystical works of Ibn Sīnā.33
We can make mention of some of these books in this study as they are the important works of alFārābī, however we should nonetheless focus on al-Madīna al-fāḍila because this is the most
relevant book for the topics of revelation and animals. Al-Fārābī also wrote numerous smaller
treatises and commentaries.34
Context of al-Fārābī’s writing
Al-Fārābī lived during the politically fraught but culturally efflorescent times of the collapse of the
Abbasid Caliphate as an effective government. The intellectual renaissance of the fourth century of
the Hijra was partially a product of the political upheavals of the time, because smaller and more
numerous government centres meant more sources of patronage for poets, historians, musicians
and so on as well as philosophers. People like Ibn Sīnā, al-Mutanabbī and al-Fārābī, leaders of their
times in their particular fields of medicine, poetry and philosophy, moved around from court to
court as was beneficial for them. The two major societal changes which caused these political
developments were the conversion of the majority of the population of the Abbasid Caliphate and
its successor states to Islam and the economic decline of Iraq. These factors have been discussed in
some detail by modern scholars of Islamic history.35 Worth mentioning is the fact that the social
context of Aristotle’s writing is rather similar to that of al-Fārābī’s – both lived during periods of

32

A critical edition of this book was published in Tehran in 1381AH, edited by Ali Owjabi, who attributes it to
al-Fārābī. See also Corbin p159, who blames the misattribution to Ibn Sīnā on an anthology published in Cairo
which included part of Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma under the name of Ibn Sīnā.
33
Such as al-Ishārāt w’at-tanbīhāt IV.
34
More detailed information on al-Fārābī’s oeuvre can be found in Walzer 1998, Netton and elsewhere. See
bibliography.
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widespread conflict and political upheaval, with occasional hostility to philosophy being expressed
by members of their communities and in societies which had been marked by their large-scale use
of slave labour.36 This makes it difficult to explain differences of opinion between the two
philosophers by means of comparing the social or political contexts of their works.
From the earliest years of Islam, the Umma or Muslim community faced a considerable variety of
theological or political controversies which could divide its members. Numerous issues such as law,
rulership, Qurʾānic exegesis and so on needed to be considered by the leaders of the community:
philosophy was one way of answering some religious and other questions which started to be
employed from around the third century of the Hijra.37
Al-Fārābī was one of the earliest of the major philosophers in Islamicate society: the only major
figure in Islamicate philosophy before him whose works still survive was al-Kindī (c. 185-252).38 The
cosmopolitan and polyglot background of al-Fārābī’s life and works is attested by consideration of
his contemporaries and fellow scholars in Baghdad who originated from a variety of places, cultures
and religious traditions, as well as the various places to which he travelled or may have travelled,
coming as he did from central Asia to Baghdad, and then moving to Damascus, Aleppo and possibly
Egypt. The widespread practice of philosophy at this time, evidenced by the corpus of al-Fārābī’s
writings and those of his fellow philosophers such as Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus, Abū Zakariyyā
Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdiyy and others, in addition to accounts of patronage from various rulers and courts,
point to the existence of a free society in which intellectual inquiry was, with some notable
exceptions, generally valued and encouraged.39

35

Notably Kennedy pp198ff.
See p49 for discussion of Aristotle and al-Fārābī’s attitudes to slavery.
37
Useful studies of the origins of Islamic philosophy include Corbin, Leaman, Adamson/Taylor, Gutas (1998
and 2000) and Walzer 1998 “Introduction”.
38
EI “al-Kindī”.
39
More detailed analyses of the context of al-Fārābī’s work include Netton pp1ff., Leaman pp17ff., and the
first two chapters of Walzer 1962, amongst others.
36
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The Structure of Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila
Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila is the best-known Arabic source for al-Fārābī’s political
philosophy, and while it certainly does feature Platonic and Peripatetic ideas, it would be a mistake
to ignore the influence of Islamic thought and faith on al-Fārābī and the writer’s originality,
although the latter may have been unintentional. The main focus of scholarship in modern times on
this book has been al-Fārābī’s idea of the active intellect and his discussions of flawed states in the
final two chapters. While these are certainly key areas in his philosophy, in this particular thesis our
aim is to suggest other influences apart from Aristotle and differences between him and al-Fārābī.
We can do this most productively by analysing less widely-studied areas, specifically revelation and
how the natures of animals and humans are related. Aristotle was not primarily concerned with
flawed states, which is also why the characteristics of flawed states according to al-Fārābī or other
areas which have been researched extensively by scholars such as Herbert Davidson40 are not
especially relevant for us here.
A very wide variety of topics is covered by al-Fārābī in al-Madīna al-fāḍila. These include, in order,
God and His Nature as the source of all things, astronomy and celestial entities, matter and form,
becoming or the generation of matter and beings, the faculties of the soul, bodies and
reproduction, reason, divination, the perfect ruler, the afterlife, philosophy and religion, and then
in two final chapters a discussion of states which stray from the correct path for various reasons.
We can see from this list how broad the scope of al-Fārābī’s writing is, but he still discusses his
ideas about these various subjects in some detail. This is why it makes sense to focus on some
specific areas so that we can analyse al-Fārābī’s ideas in depth. The most relevant chapters for us,
then, are 10 to 17 of Walzer’s critical edition On the Perfect State, although some points from other
chapters will also be discussed.
40

Davidson, H.A., 1992, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: their Cosmologies, Theories of the
Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (OUP, New York).
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Al-Fārābī’s basic method in writing al-Madīna al-fāḍila was to move from universal points and
remarks towards particular ones: he discusses God and His Nature first, and aspects of political
philosophy last. Theoretical philosophy – metaphysics and natural science – takes up most of the
first ten chapters, then in chapters 11-14 the writer starts to discuss living creatures. The remaining
chapters are a description of an ideal society and ruler, followed by criticism of political and social
faults perceived by al-Fārābī. The writer’s focus in all of these areas is on the structure or hierarchy
of all aspects of creation and its purpose – his point is that justice and order rule nature, and so
human beings must also attempt to behave in a just and orderly fashion.
Al-Fārābī’s approach is an important consideration. Al-Madīna al-fāḍila has hitherto been treated in
secondary literature almost exclusively as a doxographical source. Of course, there are in this book
many clear passages on such areas as politics or cosmology, but still the question of why al-Fārābī
wrote al-Madīna al-fāḍila is important for understanding the book itself and how it fits into his
oeuvre. Ulrich Rudolph has argued persuasively that it is a philosophic treatment of various topics
related to systematic Islamic theology. The question of the writer’s approach and rationale will be
considered throughout this study of al-Fārābī’s differences with Aristotle.
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Chapter Two: Peripatetic and Islamicate Philosophy
Peripatetic Philosophy and its Influence
Ancient Greek philosophy began by examining the nature of man. It branched out from this to
cover everything in existence in some form or another. Pre-Socratic philosophers were mainly
concerned with cosmology and ontology – these earliest Greek philosophers were distinguished
from other people who were not philosophers because philosophers rejected mythological
explanations of events, preferring to use reason to draw their conclusions.41 Socrates (c.470399BC), a somewhat mysterious figure, is credited as one of the founders of philosophy even
though he did not himself write books or treatises.42 His ideas are known mainly through later
writers such as Plato (c.425-348BC), Socrates’ student, who founded the Academy in Athens and
wrote numerous philosophical dialogues.43 Plato’s Theory of Forms is the basis of Platonic
philosophy.
Aristotle (384-322BC) was the most famous student of Plato, who disagreed with his teacher in
some areas. Born in northern Greece, he joined Plato’s academy in his late teens and remained
there for almost twenty years. It was after Plato’s death that Aristotle started to question some of
Plato’s ideas – he developed his own school of thought, called Aristotelian or Peripatetic after the
collonades in Athens where Aristotle taught. Aristotelianism was the first comprehensive system to
cover all branches of what we might now term philosophy.44 Some of the most influential aspects
of this system include Virtue Ethics, Aristotle’s supposed description of man as a “rational animal”
and his discussion of the nature of creatures. Aristotle wrote extensively, but it is thought that only
around one third of his original writings is now extant.
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Aristotle’s extant writings on animals consist of four main books specifically about animals, as well
as elements of other works. We know that these and other books by the ancient Athenian
philosophers were widely studied in the centuries after Aristotle’s death:45 after Alexander the
Great conquered western Asia and Egypt from the Persians in the fourth century BC, the successor
states of his empire were ruled by Greeks or Hellenised native people. From about 300BC until the
chaos of the Roman-Persian war at the start of the seventh century AD, study of the ancient Greek
classics in fields such as poetry, philosophy, history and mathematics flourished in Alexandria in
Egypt and Antioch in Syria (modern Turkey), as well as other places including the western areas of
the Roman Empire. The most important for our purposes of the late antique philosophers
influenced by Aristotle is Plotinus (c.205-270AD). Born in northern Egypt, Plotinus studied
philosophy in Alexandria under Ammonius Saccas. Plotinus attempted to simplify Aristotle’s
philosophy and reconcile it with Plato’s mysticism in such areas as Plotinus’ idea of the One: the
supreme, transcendent entity which is beyond all categories of being.46 Some of Plotinus’ books
were later translated into Arabic and misattributed to Aristotle, notably Uthūlūjiyā Arisṭāṭālīs (the
Theology of Aristotle) which was erroneously considered to be a translation of a genuine work by
Aristotle.47
Broadly speaking, before the Islamic conquests of the Levant and Egypt, Hellenised city dwellers
and native rural populations such as Syrians, Egyptians and Arabs existed together in these areas in
a state of mutual cultural incomprehension.48 While it is true that some Arabs of the period of
Jāhiliyya before Islam did leave their homelands to study philosophy or serve the Roman or Persian
governments,49 they were the exception – until the Abbasid Caliphate, beginning in 132, there were
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no significant Arab or Muslim philosophic movements and no attempts were made by Arabs or
Muslims to understand Greek or Graeco-Roman thought in a systematic way.

Muslims Writing Philosophy: Footnotes to Plato and Aristotle?
Initial interest in some areas of ancient Greek thought amongst the early Muslims starting in the
second century of the Hijra was essentially rooted in a desire to put it into practice: Muslims
wanted to understand ancient works on mathematics, medicine and so on because the knowledge
which might be gained from them was regarded as useful by the rulers of the Caliphate.50 The
Caliph ar-Rashīd founded bayt al-ḥikma (the House of Wisdom) in Baghdad in 217, and it was later
expanded by al-Maʾmūn in order to give force to this current in society and to give it some sort of
structure.51 Bayt al-ḥikma had dedicated teams of translators who, in concert with other translators
working independently or for some other patron, produced many translations in a period of about
two and a half centuries, roughly 150 to 400. Some were made directly from Greek, but many had
Syriac as an intermediary language. While this translation movement was what made philosophy
accessible to Muslims – very few of whom knew Greek at that time – we should remember that the
standard varied widely, owing partially to the inherent difficulties in translating philosophy and its
technical terms and the linguistic differences between Greek, Syriac and Arabic.52 It is often
uncertain which translations were available to which philosophers when and where.
The beginning of philosophy in the Muslim world was not the translation of Greek texts, however.
Muslims started to become interested in what we might now term philosophic concepts and
methods because they offered ways of solving some of the problems which arose when trying to
understand the Qurʾān. A salient example is qiyās (analogy). Early Muslim jurists, before they had
access to Aristotelian texts on logic translated into Arabic, used qiyās to determine general rules
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from particular Qurʾānic commands or prohibitions. Philosophic methods and concepts were also
relevant in the field of theology. Theologians attempting to reconcile God’s omnipotence and
omniscience with the presence of evil in the world and anthropomorphic verses in the Qurʾān used
dialectical reasoning to draw their conclusions.
Islamic philosophers (falāsifa) who had studied translated texts of Plato and Aristotle, conversely,
criticised dialectical reasoning, which works with premisses that are commonly accepted but not
logically demonstrated, and regarded it as inferior to their own demonstrative reasoning, which
works with premisses that are proven as certain and which cannot be challenged. Regarding these
early developments and conflicts from a modern standpoint, it can be somewhat unclear when
Islamic philosophy becomes Islamic theology and vice-versa.

Aristotle in Islamicate Society: Biographies, Texts and Attitudes
Philosophic and other Ṭabaqāt books contain biographies of Aristotle: for example, Ibn Abī
Uṣaybiʿa’s ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbāʾ. The first biographies in this book concern ancient
Greek and Roman philosophers and doctors - Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa begins with Asclepius and his
followers and later physicians such as Hippocrates, and then moves on to figures more famous for
their philosophy, such as Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa notes some intriguing but probably spurious stories about Aristotle, such as the
tale of his acceptance of Plato’s philosophy after God revealed Himself to Aristotle in the temple of
Minerva/Athena in Athens.53 The detailed biography of Aristotle in ʿUyūn al-Anbāʾ contains
quotations from many other writers contemporary or roughly contemporary with Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa,
including al-Fārābī himself. There is a long list of the compositions of Aristotle, which includes Kitāb
fī’r-rūḥ (On the Soul),54 Kitāb fī ittikhādh al-ḥayawān (On the Adoption of Animals), Kitāb fī ḥarikat
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al-ḥayawānāt wa-tashrīḥihā (On the Movement of Animals and their Feeding), Kitāb fī ṭabāʾiʿ alḥayawān (On the Natures of Animals) and several other books on animals.55 Other mediaeval
biographers who wrote in Arabic about Aristotle, such as Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī56 or ash-Shahrazūrī,57
give similar lists of books.
One can note some important points from this brief analysis of biographies of Aristotle, the most
relevant of which for our purposes is that determining the reliability of the mediaeval Arabic
versions of Aristotle’s works is problematic. This is because, while it is possible that the books on
animals which Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa lists were genuinely written by Aristotle, it is more likely that at
least some of them are misattributions or double-listings of different translations or editions of the
same book under different titles.
We cannot be certain which editions of Aristotle al-Fārābī consulted, and we cannot be sure
whether Aristotle’s biological works were available to al-Fārābī, either in translation or in the
original Greek. Understanding which editions he may have read is important for us in determining
how al-Fārābī understood Aristotle, because inevitably the various translated editions of Aristotle’s
works, mediaeval and modern, differ in some specific details, and moreover translators found
different ways of rendering the technical philosophic terms used by Aristotle. This is an important
point because the different Arabic words which might be used to translate one Greek word may
have slightly different significations and might thus cause the reader to misunderstand or
misrepresent what Aristotle originally wrote – hence the caveat when talking about al-Fārābī’s
originality that it may have been unintentional. He could equally have read versions of Aristotle’s
books which were expanded by translator-philosophers and used the ideas therein in the mistaken
belief that they really were Aristotle’s and not those of another interpolator or commentator.
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It may be that al-Fārābī read Kitāb al-ḥayawān, a mediaeval Arabic translation from a Syriac edition
of Aristotle’s works on animals including some of the books listed by Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa.58 We know,
conversely, that al-Fārābī definitely could understand some Greek,59 so it is not unreasonable to
suggest that he might well have read Aristotle in Greek using help from some of his contemporaries
who read this language fluently.60 That said, there is no indication that he had any knowledge of
Syriac.61 Bearing in mind these general statements on this matter, we ought to consult the Greek of
Aristotle in the main in order best to evaluate what Aristotle himself said rather than how he was
interpreted and translated.
Analysis of some of the biographies of Aristotle which circulated in mediaeval Islamicate society
backs up the general point that there necessarily must be some differences between his thought
and those of Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī. While biographers did sometimes insert
dubious anecdotes about God revealing Himself to Aristotle, there was no serious attempt to cast
Aristotle as a religious scholar or a Muslim before Islam. Al-Fārābī’s studies in Peripatetic
philosophy and his interest in ancient Greek logic did not interfere with his religious faith or lead
biographers to call him an apostate – this means that he did not commit himself totally to
Aristotle’s teachings, because some of them run counter to Islam. The veracity of this statement
can be demonstrated by analysing some key passages from al-Madīna al-Fāḍila.
The basic question which faces us when looking at al-Madīna al-Fāḍila and other works is whether
al-Fārābī came up with his ideas independently or sourced them from origins other than Aristotle.
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This is why understanding what Aristotle wrote, and indeed where he wrote it, is relevant. We will
have cause to note that ho theos, “God”, or sometimes “god” (i.e. of ancient Greek paganism), as
written by Aristotle does not have the same religious significance which a Muslim such as al-Fārābī
would apply to it. An important term to be researched is fiṭra, variously translated as “primordial
nature”, “original human disposition” and in other ways. Similarities between the two writers could
be coincidence, or al-Fārābī may have arrived at his ideas independently of Aristotle, and only later
realised after reading the latter’s books that they were in agreement in some areas. Moreover, alFārābī definitely did disagree with Aristotle in many cases, sometimes because of his own personal
analysis, and sometimes, for example in areas such as revelation and Prophethood, because
disagreement with ancient Peripatetic philosophy is religiously mandated for Muslims.
This hypothesis can be tested by quoting relevant sections of al-Madīna al-Fāḍila and attempting to
analyse what they can tell us, while also comparing what Aristotle had to say about the matter at
hand and looking with care at secondary sources where relevant. The focus is on ideas, however
considerations of literary style, structure, methodology and other features of al-Fārābī’s writing are
also important for a full examination of the relevant sections of the main primary source.
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Chapter Three: Revelation and the Revealer
God in al-Fārābī and His Interactions with Man
One of the most crucial differences between the God of revealed religion in whom al-Fārābī
believed and Aristotle’s First Cause or Prime Mover is God’s involvement in the world and His wish
to reveal Himself to humanity. We know from al-Fārābī’s biography and milieu that he was a
Muslim living in a society where revealed religions were prominent, even though we also know
from his biography that he used Aristotle’s ideas in some places. For this reason we ought to
approach reading al-Fārābī’s books from a neutral standpoint, without assuming which of the many
influences on the writer dominated. Some modern scholars, such as Richard Walzer in particular,
are inclined to take the Aristotelian or Hellenistic paradigm for granted when commenting on alMadīna al-fāḍila. When discussing al-Fārābī’s political philosophy, Walzer assumes that there must
be a Greek predecessor for this:62
“One obviously wonders who the author of this unusual synthesis of Aristotle and Plato may
have been or, if this question cannot be answered, whether at least his place in the history of
later Greek philosophy can somehow be circumscribed.”
One perhaps wonders instead why we are looking for this predecessor when there is no evidence
that he existed, much less that he influenced al-Fārābī. Walzer later admits that there is an Islamic
context for al-Fārābī’s political thought,63 but we should remember that this could equally be
applied to all of the content of al-Madīna al-fāḍila.
Sometimes this Islamic context is very obvious, such as when al-Fārābī discusses what happens
when all the intellects come together in one person:64
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عز
ّ  فيكون اهلل،وحى إليه
َ ُوإذا حصل ذلك يف كال جزءَي قوته الناطقة ومها النظرية والعملية مث يف قوته املتخيّلة كان هذا اإلنسان هو الذي ي
ِ
بتوسط
ّ الفعال يفيضه العقل
ّ  فيكون ما يفيض من اهلل تبارك وتعاىل إىل العقل،الفعال
ّ بتوسط العقل
ّ الفعال إىل عقله املنفعل
ّ وجل يُوحي إليه
ّ
 ومبا يفيض منه إىل القوة65 فيكون مبا يفيض منه إىل عقله املنفعل حكيما فيلسوفا ومتعقال على التمام،العقل املستفاد مث إىل قوته املتخيّلة
.املتخيّلة نبيّا ومنذرا مبا سيكون وخمربا مبا هو اآلن من اجلزئيات موجود
When this occurs in both parts of his rational faculty, namely the theoretical and practical
rational faculties, and also in his representative faculty, then it is this man who receives
revelation, and God Almighty grants him revelation through the mediation of the active
intellect, so that the emanation from God Almighty to the active intellect is passed on to his
passive intellect through the mediation of his acquired intellect, and then to the faculty of
representation. Thus he is, through the emanation from the active intellect to his passive
intellect, a wise man, a philosopher and an accomplished thinker, and through the emanation of
the active intellect to his faculty of representation a visionary Prophet who warns of things to
come and tells of particular things at present.
The main significance of this passage is that it is the first specific mention of God, that is to say
Allāh, the god of revealed religion, in al-Madīna al-fāḍila. The text of this passage clearly
demonstrates that al-Fārābī believes in God who reveals Himself to humanity and selects from
amongst humans Prophets who preach to the other members of society. This is a key aspect of alFārābī’s political philosophy, but it is also centrally important for the entire system because we can
note from this section that the writer’s conception of God is, in this case, very similar to that of
conventional Islamic belief at the time while also being quite radically divorced from that of
Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers. The writer does not give any indication before this
section that he will discuss revealed religion – what we might infer from this is that al-Fārābī took
for granted the idea that Prophets have the highest level of intellect in his system and receive
revelation from God. These ideas run counter to the Aristotelian concept of the Prime Mover or
impersonal God.
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Part of the unfamiliar complexity of this passage, however, lies in exactly how a visionary Prophet
gains his revelation from God: he receives revelation as a result of emanation from Him. Emanation
also applies to interactions between the intellects and faculties of the soul, so it is clear that alFārābī does not use the word and its derived forms as a specific technical term applied only to God,
but the fact that it can be applied to God also is significant for understanding what the writer
believed about the Nature of God and how he interacts with people.66 A possible result of this
research could also be adumbrated here: new ideas could be suggested on the topic of the
relationship between philosophy and Prophethood. We might re-examine this little-studied
passage from a religious point of view, rather than treating it as pure philosophy, if the thesis that
al-Fārābī did not make Aristotle his central focus were accepted.
The only other direct mentions of God in al-Madīna al-fāḍila occur during al-Fārābī’s explanation of
the different kinds of flawed states:67

الفعال وكل شيء سبيله أن يعلمه أهل
ّ وأما املدينة الفاسقة فهي اليت آراؤها آراء الفاضلة وهي تعلم السعادة واهلل
ّ وجل والثواين والعقل
ّ عز
 واملدينة املب ّدلة هي اليت كانت آراؤها وأفعاهلا يف القدمي آراء. ولكن تكون أفعال أهلها أفعال أهل املدن اجلاهلية،املدينة الفاضلة ويعتقدوهنا
تؤم بعد
ّ  واملدينة الضالّة هي اليت. غري أهنا تب ّدلت فدخلت فيها آراء غري تلك واستحالت أفعاهلا إىل غري تلك،أهل املدينة الفاضلة وأفعاهلا
68
الفعال آراء فاسدة ال تصلح عليها وال إن أ ُِخذت على أهنا متثيالت
ّ حياهتا هذه السعادة وتعتقد يف اهلل
ّ وجل ويف الثواين ويف العقل
ّ عز

 ويكون قد استعمل يف ذلك التمويهات واملخادعات، ويكون رئيسها األول ممن أوهم أنه ُموحى إليه من غري أن يكون كذلك.وختييالت هلا
.والغرور
The sinful 69 state is that whose views are the views of the perfect state. It knows happiness, God
Almighty, the existents of the second order, the active intellect and everything which is known
by the people of the perfect state and in which they believe, however the actions of its people
66
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are the actions of the people of the pagan 70 states. The changed state is that whose views and
actions were, in the past, the views of the perfect state and its actions, but they have been
changed: other views have entered it and its actions have been transformed into other actions.
The state which strays from the straight path 71is the state which aims at happiness after this life
and holds above God Almighty, the existents of the second order and the active intellect
depraved and useless beliefs, even if they were taken as representations and symbols. Its first ruler
was a man who pretended to be receiving revelation while he was not, and in order to make this
impression he used falsifications, cheating and deceptions.
The most immediately noteworthy aspect of this section is the prominent mentions of God.
Although the context here is political, we can still determine from this part of al-Madīna al-fāḍila
the importance of religious belief in the writer’s philosophy: one of the first markers of the perfect
state, and one which is partially or formerly shared by the flawed states, is belief in God Almighty.
Al-Fārābī uses religious terminology when he introduces the concept of the pagan state. The word
jāhiliyya functioning as an adjective denotes something pagan or pertaining to pre-Islamic times.72
Walzer incorrectly translates this word as “ignorant” and talks about “ignorant cities”, but for us to
adopt this rendering we would have to ignore the penultimate letter, yāʾ, in jāhiliyya and read
jāhila instead.73 That al-Fārābī describes a group of states using the terminology of revealed religion
demonstrates the centrality of religious faith in his system, and specifically it demonstrates the
importance of revelation – there can be no pagan state which has accepted revelation from God
and applied it.
The writer also uses religious terminology to describe the other flawed states, al-madīna al-fāsiqa
and al-madīna aḍ-ḍālla. These words, commonly translated as “sinful” and “erring” respectively,
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are used extensively in the Qurʾān. We can take as an example a prominent verse in which they are
used together:74

ِ
ِ
ِ ِ
ين َك َفُرواْ فَيَ ُقولُو َن َما َذآ أ ََر َاد
ْ َإِن ٱللهَ الَ يَ ْستَ ْحى أَن ي
َ ُب َمثَال ما بَع
َ ض ِر
َ ين َآمنُواْ فَيَ ْعلَ ُمو َن أَنهُ ٱ ْْلَق من رهِّب ْم َوأَما ٱلذ
َ وضة فَ َما فَ ْوقَ َها فَأَما ٱلذ
ِِ
ِ ِ
ِ ِ ِ
ِ ِ ِ
ِ
ي
َ ٱللهُ ِّبَ َذا َمثَال يُضل بِه َكثريا َويَ ْهدي بِه َكثريا َوَما يُضل بِه إِال ٱلْ َفسق
God does not disdain to use an example, even of a gnat, or what is above it. Those who believe
know that it is the Truth from their Lord, but those who are false say “What did God want with
this example?” He leads many astray by it and He guides many by it, but He does not lead
anyone astray except those who sin.
Fāsiq clearly has a moral value, and although ḍalla and its derived forms did originally have
descriptive meanings they took on new religious connotations after their use in the Qurʾān which
persisted from mediaeval times until the present day.75 This comparison demonstrates that alFārābī may have used these terms because of their religious connotations in order to emphasise
the importance of religious belief in his philosophic system.76 For this reason he did not use more
general terms to describe the flawed states: he did not talk about al-madīna as-sayyiʾa or almadīna ash-sharīra, for example.
We can also find an Islamic influence in al-Fārābī’s idea of the changed state. The idea that this
state formerly held correct views and later changed them bears a striking resemblance to the
concept of bidʿa, innovation, in Islam. Innovators changed Islamic practices and ideas – in doing so,
they removed themselves from true Islam.77 Thus we can suggest that al-Fārābī views the principles
of the perfect state as being the ideal principles of the Muslim community. Thus also, part of the
reason that al-Fārābī uses Allāh ʿizza wa-jall in a political context is to make a contrast with
Aristotle’s idea of the Prime Mover.
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Although these are the only instances of the specific word Allāh being used in al-Madīna al-fāḍila,
we know by comparison with al-Fārābī’s other books that he also means God when he talks about
the First Cause:78
79
.الفعال
ّ  وهو السبب القريب لوجود الثواين ولوجود العقل،فاألول هو الذي ينبغي أن يُعتقد فيه أنّه هو اإلله
ّ

It is appropriate that the First [Cause] is that which is considered to be God, and it is the
immediate reason for the existence of the existents of the second order and for the existence of
the active intellect.
This passage demonstrates that al-Fārābī uses as-sabab al-awwal (or simply al-awwal for short) to
mean God. Having understood this, we can look at the first chapters of al-Madīna al-fāḍila for more
information on the Nature of God in al-Fārābī’s view.
In chapter 2 of al-Madīna al-fāḍila, al-Fārābī talks about the First Cause as the origin of all being,
and he also describes in some detail the Nature of the First Cause:80

 نتجوهر بإحدمها، كما أن لنا شيئي، يكون بإحدمها جتوهر ذاته وباآلخر حصول شيء آخر عنه،و[السبب األول] ليس ينقسم إىل شيئي
. بل ذات واحدة وجوهر واحد به يكون جتوهره وبه بعينه حيصل عنه شيء آخر،وهو النطق ونكتب باآلخر وهو صناعة الكتابة
أكمل
ُ وال أيضا حيتاج يف أن يفيض عن وجوده
َ ] وليس وجوده مبا يفيض عنه وجود غريه...[ وجود شيء آخر إىل شيء غري ذاته يكون فيه
. بل مها مجيعا ذات واحدة، وال وجوده الذي به جتوهره أكمل من الذي يفيض عنه وجود غريه،من وجوده الذي به جتوهره
. ال من نفسه وال من خارج أصال،وال ميكن أيضا أن يكون له عائق من أن يفيض عنه وجود غريه
[The First Cause] is not divided into two things, by one of which His essence becomes substance
and by the other something else occurs from Him as we have two things: we become substance
by one of them, namely articulated speech, and we write by the other, namely the art of writing.
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But He is one essence and one substance through which He becomes substance and through
which other things occur.
Nor does He need, in order that the existence of something else emanate from His existence,
anything except His own essence. […] His existence is not, by the existence of something else
emanating from it, more perfect than His existence by which He becomes substance, nor is His
existence by which He becomes substance more perfect than the existence of something else
which emanates from it, but they are both one essence.
It is also not possible at all that there might be something to prevent that the existence of
something else emanates from Him, not from Himself or from outside Him.
At issue in this passage are several points, the most important of which is the concept of
emanation, fayḍ. Not only did Aristotle never go into detail about the nature of the Prime Mover,
but he also did not use any words related to emanation or similar concepts, although Plotinus did
use related Greek words in his writings.81
Al-Fārābī may have included more details on the Nature of the First Cause than Aristotle did on the
Prime Mover as a result of the former’s wish to express his ideas more fully and accurately, or
indeed to distance himself from Aristotle and strengthen his Muslim credentials. It is indeed
possible that these statements about the absolute unity and indivisible nature of the First Cause
are connected with contemporary or near-contemporary theological debates about the Oneness of
God amongst groups like the Muʿtazila, as argued by Rudolph.82
Fayḍ can be simply a philosophic way of saying waḥy.83 When we compare section 10 of chapter
15,84 we can see that the visionary prophet is so because of an emanation from God, which in
theological terms is revelation from God. It is significant, however, that nuṭq, articulated speech, is
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mentioned by al-Fārābī in connection with emanation because we know that God speaks directly to
the world and things in the Qurʾān:85

ِ ب ِديع ٱلسمو
ِ ت َوٱأل َْر
ول لَهُ ُك ْن فَيَ ُكو ُن
ُ ضى أ َْمرا فَِإَّنَا يَ ُق
َ َض َوإِ َذا ق
ََ ُ َ
He is the Originator of the Heavens and the Earth, and if He decrees something He says only
“Be!” and so it is.
God’s speaking to things in order to make them may have been what al-Fārābī had in mind when he
discussed the indivisibility of the First Cause and how articulated speech is separate from writing
for humans. God decreed that people follow His will, which was why He revealed the Qurʾān, itself
a form of emanation.
Perhaps the most important passage demonstrating the nature of the perfect state is the beginning
of chapter 17 on philosophy and religion. Al-Fārābī describes what should be known by the people
of the perfect state:86

]...[ ،) أوهلا معرفة السبب األول ومجيع ما يوصف به١( فأما األشياء املشرتكة اليت ينبغي أن يعلمها مجيع أهل املدينة الفاضلة فهي أشياء
]...[ ) مث الرئيس األول وكيف يكون الوحي٦(
As for the things in common which all the people of the perfect state ought to know, they are:
(1) knowledge of the First Cause and all how He is described […] (6) then the first ruler and how
there is revelation […]
Having established that al-Fārābī viewed God and the First Cause as one and the same, it is
significant that he would state that knowledge of the First Cause is the first thing which the people
of the perfect state ought to know, and that belief in revelation also makes the list. This is because
such statements demonstrate al-Fārābī’s disagreement with Aristotle and agreement with Islamic
teaching.

85
86

Al-Baqara (2): 117.
V, 17, §1 (pp276-278)

31

Differences from Aristotle’s Conception of God
Al-Fārābī’s philosophy, both of God specifically and when he describes God using the term the First
Cause, means that any human notion of the existence of God cannot progress beyond acceptance
of the fact that His existence has nothing whatsoever in common with what we mean when we talk
about anything else, except in some crucial areas such a revelation and emanation.87 We need to
bear this fact in mind when comparing al-Fārābī with Aristotle. The most immediate difference
between Aristotle and al-Fārābī is the latter’s acceptance of divine revelation. In ancient Athens,
without Islam and the Qurʾān or any other form of accepted divine revelation or expression, it
would have been impossible for Aristotle to use revelation as a concept and include it in his
philosophy. Indeed, the way that Aristotle describes God is very different from how a Muslim such
as al-Fārābī would have understood His nature:88

We must be careful not to ignore the question whether “soul” can be defined in a single
unambiguous formula, as is the case with animal, or whether we must not give a separate
formula for each of it, as we do for horse, dog, man, god, in the latter case the universal animal and so too every other common predicate - being treated either as nothing at all or as a later
product.89
Describing God as “the universal animal” would have been unacceptable to al-Fārābī. As we will see
below,90 he held the belief that animals are created by God, and God is the source of creation. It
should also be remembered that, as noted above,91 al-Fārābī emphatically states that the First
Cause cannot be divided, rather He is one and indivisible. This means that al-Fārābī rejects the idea
that a separate formula could be given for each part of the First Cause, God.
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Aristotle does not himself use the word ho theos, God, in his Metaphysics until Book 12:92

If, then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we enjoy sometimes, it
is wondrous; and if it is greater, this is still more wondrous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life
belongs to God. For the operation of the mind is life, and God is that operation; and the essential
operation of God is life most good and eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being,
eternal, most good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that
is what God is.93
Even here Aristotle does not make any mention of revelation or Prophets, necessarily because
these concepts did not exist at that time, and certainly not in the same way as mediaeval Muslims
understood them. It is also worth noting that while al-Fārābī does talk about God having feelings of
pleasure,94 he does not talk about God having emotions or feelings such as happiness, although he
does frequently discuss human happiness in connection with pointing out the flaws of certain
states.95 Al-Fārābī explicitly states that God’s pleasure cannot be compared in any way to human
pleasure or happiness.96 In al-Madīna al-fāḍila, there is no sense that God has the emotion of
happiness or that any of His wishes can be likened to human wishes or inclinations. Nowhere in alMadīna al-fāḍila does al-Fārābī state that God is life. He also does not say that God is continuous
eternal existence. While it can be understood from al-Madīna al-fāḍila that God is alive and God
exists continuously and eternally, the writer does not at any point state that life and God are
synonymous.
Walzer notes in his commentary on al-Madīna al-fāḍila97 that the Arabic word for angel98 could be
used to render the Greek word theos. Even though there are no instances of this occurring in al-

92

1072b, ll25ff.
εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν: εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον.
ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει: ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε
ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ: τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.
94
I, 1, §14
95
For example, V, 15, §19 (pp256-258), quoted and analysed above pp26-27.
96
I, 1, §14
97
pp363-364
98
Malak – Lane;Wehr
93

33

Fārābī’s writing, if true it would demonstrate a different attitude in mediaeval Arabic philosophical
writing from that held by ancient Greek philosophers, because in revealed religion angels are
created by the One God, whereas varying accounts exist in ancient Greek paganism for how there
might be numerous different gods and how the word theos might be applied to several distinct
entities. Colmo suggests that sometimes al-Fārābī’s views conflict with both Islam and ancient
philosophy because al-Fārābī viewed the emanation of the world from God as a necessary
occurrence, even though this would mean that God’s free will is circumscribed.99

Al-Fārābī’s Use and Opinion of Independent Reasoning
For al-Fārābī, “philosophic tradition” is an oxymoron, as Colmo notes,100 quoting and disagreeing
with Walzer:101
“But Aristotelian cosmology and biological research (enriched by the results obtained by
Hellenistic scientists) were now accepted as almost dogmatic truth. Both late Greek
philosophers and their Muslim followers acclaimed almost unanimously and without
substantial reservation a very complicated structure laboriously established by Aristotelians
and Platonists and others. They no longer fully realised ‘the hypothetical character of
postulates, to which centuries of unquestioned tradition had given the appearance of selfevidence.’”
In the case of al-Fārābī, this is not true. As we have seen in this chapter, and will continue to
examine in the following sections on animals and man and the soul, al-Fārābī clearly replaced some
Aristotelian beliefs with Muslim ones. We should also remember, though, that he had his own
original beliefs which could be in conformity with neither Islam nor Peripatetic philosophy.
Al-Fārābī’s original thought, which may be seen to occur in contrast with Islam to an extent, can be
demonstrated effectively by analysis of his statements on happiness and the afterlife. Let us
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examine al-Fārābī’s own definition of happiness from al-Madīna al-fāḍila:102

 وذلك، وهذه املعقوالت إَّنا ُجعلت له ليسنعملها يف أن يصري إىل استكماله األخري،وحصول املعقوالت األول لإلنسان هو استكماله األول
 وذلك أن تصري يف مجلة األشياء،مادة
ّ  وهي أن تصري نفس اإلنسان من الكمال يف الوجود إىل حيث ال حتتاج يف قوامها إىل.هو السعادة
]...[  وأن تبقى على تلك اْلال دائما أبدا،الربيئة عن األجسام ويف مجلة اجلواهر املفارقة للمو ّاد
The first obtaining of the intelligibles for a person is his first perfection, and yet these intelligibles
are made for him so that he might use them to reach his ultimate perfection, which is happiness.
This means that the person’s soul reaches perfection in existence such that it does not need
matter for its support, because it becomes one of the incorporeal things and one of the
immaterial substances and it remains in this state forever […]
Al-Fārābī defines saʿāda as a human person’s ultimate perfection. While we can note that this
differs from the common definition of the word,103 the striking element of this passage is how the
writer then defines perfection in existence. One might think that this is surely unobtainable by
humans: if a soul was not already without need for matter, it is difficult to see how it might achieve
this state except by dying and moving to the next life.
This challenging passage begs more questions than it answers. It would be tempting to label this a
mystical passage and compare it with some passages from Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma, a mystical work ascribed
to al-Fārābī , but any such research is a task for the future.
In the following section from the chapter on reason from al-Madīna al-fāḍila, al-Fārābī describes
the purpose of happiness:104
والسعادة هي اخلري املطلوب لذاته وليست تُطلب أصال وال يف وقت من األوقات لينال ِّبا شيء آخر وليس وراءها شيء آخر ميكن أن يناله اإلنسان
 هذه هي، واهليئات وامللكات اليت عنها تصدر هذه األفعال هي الفضائل، واألفعال اإلرادية اليت تنفع يف بلوغ السعادة هي األفعال اجلميلة.أعظم منها
.اخلريات ال ألجل ذواهتا بل إَّنا هي خريات ألجل السعادة

102

IV, 13, §5 (pp204-206)

35

Happiness is the good thing which is sought for its own sake: it is not sought at all at any time
whatsoever for obtaining something else through it, and there is not beyond it any other thing
which is greater than it for one to obtain. The voluntary actions which benefit in reaching
happiness are fine actions, and the dispositions and habits which proceed from these actions are
virtues: these are good things not for their own sake but instead they are good things for the sake
of happiness.
Happiness exists as a goal above religious obligation or any other purpose. Al-Fārābī does not reject
the Islamic teaching that true happiness occurs in the afterlife, but he places happiness for its own
sake as a higher goal than anything else in our mortal lives. This means that happiness is a higher
purpose than religious observance – and yet some of the flawed states know happiness as well as
God.105 One wonders how this can be so. Regardless of the exact meaning of these difficult
passages in chapter 13 and how we wish to fit together the ideas in them, we can certainly say that
the depth and manner of explanation of such ideas are original to al-Fārābī, demonstrative of his
ability to reason independently and view of the benefit in doing so.
Another notable example of al-Fārābī’s original thought is his description of what happens to the
inhabitants of the various states after they die. When talking about the afterlife in connection with
flawed states, the writer says that the inhabitants of the pagan or pre-Islamic state will suffer total
destruction, including destruction of their souls, when they die:106

مادة ضرورة إذ مل يرتسم فيها رسم حقيقة ِس َوى
ّ  أما مدن اجلاهلية فإن أنفسهم تبقى غري مستكملة وحمتاجة يف قوامها إىل:فأهل هذه املدن
.] هؤالء هم اهلالكون والصائرون إىل العدم على مثال ما يكون عليه البهائم والسباع واألفاعي...[ .املعقوالت األول أصال
As for the people of these states, the souls of the pagan state remain imperfect and necessarily
requiring matter for their preservation as no truth has been impressed upon them at all apart
from the first intelligibles. […] These are the people who perish and become nothing, just like
cattle, beasts of prey and snakes.
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We will return to the meaning of this passage later in order to consider its statements about
animals,107 but what is to be noted in connection with reasoning is the total destruction of the
people of the pagan state once their physical bodies are destroyed. This would appear to be in
conflict with Islamic teaching.
The Qurʾān says that evil people will be condemned to Hell, and it also says that those who seek
only for the goods of this world will go to Hell after dying.108 By saying that the inhabitants of
flawed states are simply destroyed after death, al-Fārābī simply ignores Islamic doctrine on the
matter and replaces it with his own ideas.109
Brief mention can be made of how al-Ghazālī misunderstood al-Fārābī’s belief in the destruction of
the souls of the inhabitants of the pagan state after death. Al-Ghazālī grouped philosophers
together in various different categories in his book al-Munqidh min aḍ-ḍalāl, one of which is the
naturalists. He claimed that these naturalists denied the eternity of the soul, and that they thus
denied the existence of Heaven, Hell, Resurrection and Judgement.110 In the case of al-Fārābī
though, this is not entirely true, because al-Fārābī only denied the eternity of the souls of the pagan
state’s inhabitants, while preserving a belief in revelation along with other ideas which come with
it. He did not deny Resurrection or Judgement, he simply suggested his own ideas about the
destruction of sinful or corrupt souls. We can thus understand something of the origin of the idea
that al-Fārābī was classed as an Aristotelian philosopher by noting al-Ghazālī’s failure fully and
accurately to understand and represent this significant aspect of al-Fārābī’s philosophy.
As an example of al-Fārābī’s attitude towards original thought, we can turn to his discussion of how
the First Cause can be known by people. After discussing the matters known by the people of the
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virtuous state,111 the writer talks about how these things can be known:112

صل يف
ُ  وذلك أن َحي،وهذه األشياء تعرف بأحد وجهي إما أن ترتسم يف نفوسهم كما هي موجودة وإما أن ترتسم فيهم باملناسبة والتمثيل
 ومن يلي اْلكماء يعرفون هذه على ما هي، فحكماء املدينة هم الذين يعرفون هذه برباهي وببصائر أنفسهم.نفوسهم مثاالهتا اليت حتاكيها
لتفهمها
ّ  والباقون منهم يعرفوهنا باملثاالت اليت حتاكيها ألهنم ال ُمنّة يف أذهاهنم،موجودة ببصائر اْلكماء اتّباعا هلم وتصديقا هلم وثقة ِّبم
. وكِلتا مها معرفتان ّإال أن اليت للحكماء أفضل ال حمالة.على ما هي موجودة إما بالطبع وإما بالعادة
These things are known in one of two ways, either by being impressed 113 on their souls as they
exist or by being impressed on them through affinity and symbolism. In that case, symbols arise
in them which reproduce them. The philosophers of the city are those who know these things
through demonstrative proofs and their own insight. Those who follow the philosophers know
them as they exist through the insight of the philosophers, following them, believing them and
trusting them. Other people know them through symbols which reproduce them because there
is no way for their minds to understand them as they exist, neither by nature nor habit. Both of
these are kinds of knowledge, although that of the philosophers is definitely better.
The idea that there are two different kinds of knowledge of God and His nature and
commandments supports the notion that al-Fārābī valued individual reason: the philosophers use
demonstrative proofs and their own insight and, it is implied, religious proofs and revelation,
whereas other people who are neither philosophers nor their followers use only religious proofs
and revelation. Religion, thus, is an imitative representation of philosophic truth for those unable to
understand the latter – without the Qurʾān, philosophers would still be able to arrive at such beliefs
as the Oneness of God. As above,114 examination of this passage would become important as a
result of the acceptance of the idea that al-Fārābī broke with Aristotle. A fresh analysis of the
relationship between religious and philosophic knowledge according to al-Fārābī might be
undertaken in the future which could give further support to the theory of the uniqueness of
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Islamic philosophy.
If we were to accept the assertion that the commonly-assumed Aristotelian context of al-Fārābī’s
writing ought to be replaced with an Islamic and independent one, “impressed on their souls” is a
highly significant statement. It reminds us of the idea of fiṭra,115 but also has a mystical implication,
because something impressed or ordained upon the soul is not something acquired by logical
thought and reasoning. If it were to be accepted that al-Fārābī can be viewed as being outside the
Aristotelian tradition in some areas, further research in the future into the presence of mysticism in
his work may yield results.
Lameer, referring specifically to the first two lines of the text quoted above, believes that Plato may
have inspired al-Fārābī’s view,116 and yet this assertion is not supported by analysis of key sections
of Plato’s work. Let us take as an example the same passage which from Republic VI which Lameer
quotes:117

“And would you also say,” I said, “that differentiating between truth and untruth is like defining
the opinable118 against the knowable119 and the likeness120 against that of which it is a
likeness?”121
While Plato also distinguishes between two types of realisation – and it is quite possible that later
philosophers such as Plotinus who were influenced by both Plato and Aristotle might have accepted
this assertion – these two types are different from those suggested by al-Fārābī. Realisation is a
suitable term to describe the category including opinion and knowledge, because clearly al-Fārābī
regarded philosophic and religious truth as different kinds of knowledge. He specifically stated that
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both are kinds of knowledge.122 It is more likely that this idea is original than that it is a significantly
altered version of Plato’s statement above as Lameer claims, because al-Fārābī’s thoughts on the
matter contradict Plato’s.
While we should stop short of calling al-Fārābī a theologian, Rudolph’s preliminary study123 of
theological themes and influences does offer some compelling arguments. His chapter “Reflections
on al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila” compares al-Madīna al-fāḍila with some
theological works of the period. Rudolph’s striking conclusion that the structure and overall content
of al-Ashʿarī’s Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, al-Māturīdī’s Kitāb at-tawḥīd and al-Juwaynī’s Kitāb al-Irshād have
close parallels with al-Madīna al-fāḍila seems to be persuasive and based on convincing evidence.
What this might mean is that al-Fārābī was attempting to reconcile Islamic theology with Islamicate
philosophy, and this, in turn, might explain why there are specific references to revealed religion in
a book ostensibly about philosophy qua philosophy, although significant research would be
required before the theological aspects of al-Fārābī’s thought could be described in detail.
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humā maʿrifatān, lit. “they are two knowledges” (V, 17, §2 (p278, l14))
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Chapter Four: Man’s Nature and that of Animals
Faculties of the Soul and Political Comparisons
Animals and man necessarily have some basic commonalities in most philosophic systems, because
both are usually said to have been created by either God or an impersonal first cause. Thus alFārābī divides animals into two categories, speaking (or rational) and non-speaking (or nonrational). Al-Fārābī first discusses this distinction in chapter 4, on sublunary existents:124

 واملعدنية مثل،االسطقسات مثل النار واهلواء واملاء واألرض وما جانسها من البخار واللهيب وغري ذلك
واألجسام الطبيعية من هذه هي
ّ
. واْليوان الناطق، واْليوان غري الناطق، والنبات،اْلجارة وما جانسها
The natural sublunary bodies are elements like fire, air, water, earth and what is of their genus,
such as steam, flame and other things; minerals like rocks and what is of their genus; plants;
animals without speech,125 and speaking animals.126
Given that man is clearly a sublunary existent, even though he is not mentioned specifically by
name here, he must fit into one of these categories. “Speaking animals” would appear to be the
closest, and in suggesting that humans fit into this category we discover much about the closeness
of humans and animals according to the writer. Humans are described as animals, although
modified by an active participle. An important question which is raised by this passage is how one
ought to render nāṭiq.
In chapter 8 of al-Madīna al-fāḍila, on becoming, the writer discusses how living creatures
necessarily occur as a result of the occurrence of prime matter, elements and other things and their
mixing together:127
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III, 4, §3 (pp106-108)
Or “animals which are not rational”.
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Or “rational animals”.
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III, 8, §4 (p140)
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ِ
 حيدث النبات باختالط أكثر.أقل
أقل تركيبا ويكون بعدها من
فاملعدنيّات حتدث باختالط أقرب إىل
ّ
ّ
ّ االسطقسات بُرتب
ّ االسطقسات و
 واإلنسان وحده هو الذي. واْليوان غري الناطق حيدث باختالط أكثر تركيبا من النبات.االسطقسات بُِرتب أكثر
منها تركيبا وأبعد عن
ّ
.حيدث عن االختالط األخري
Minerals occur by a mixture which is nearer to the elements and which is less complex, and their
distance from the elements is less in rank. Plants occur by a mixture which is more complex than
theirs, and they are removed from the elements by a further stage. Animals without speech128
occur by a mixture which is more complex than that of plants. Man alone is that which occurs
by the last mixture.
The commonality we can note between animals and humans in al-Madīna al-fāḍila is that both
occur as a necessary result of the various mixtures between prime matter, elements etc. which alFārābī discusses.129 While it should be noted that al-Fārābī consciously deviated from Aristotle in his
descriptions of prime matter130 and that al-Fārābī also chose not to differentiate the two Arabic
words mizāj and ikhtilāṭ which are both used interchangeably for “mixture”,131 the question is how
to read nāṭiq. One might either take it literally, or assert that al-ḥayawān an-nāṭiq seems to refer to
Aristotle’s purported description of man as a “rational animal”. It would appear that animals are
contrasted with humanity by means of the writer’s clarification that they do not speak, or that they
are not rational.
The most important question which is raised by this passage is which sense of the word nuṭq (or,
here, its derived form nāṭiq, the active participle) is intended by al-Fārābī. As noted above,132 the
basic meaning of nuṭq is “(articulated) speech”, hence the basic meaning of nāṭiq is “speaker” or
“one who employs articulated speech”.133 It seems obvious that animals cannot employ articulated
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Or “animals which are not rational”.
The celestial bodies are described in III, 7, and then elements and mixtures are described in III, 8, §1-3.
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Cf. Ibid. p379, who states that the Greek words krāsis and mixis were differentiated by Alexander of
Aphrodisias when commenting on Aristotle. Also Lane, Wehr mizāj; ikhtilāṭ and Liddell-Scott, Morwood
krāsis; mixis.
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speech, so one wonders why al-Fārābī might use such a description. The conclusion which might
then be drawn is that the meaning of the root can be changed by the writer to suit his purposes.
Thus we could render nāṭiq in chapter 8, section 4 as “rational”.134 Conversely, by comparison with
other passages in al-Madīna al-fāḍila,135 we can find support for the idea that al-Fārābī uses nuṭq
and its derived forms as terms with consistent meanings. This challenges the idea that al-ḥayawān
ghayr an-nāṭiq is to be understood within the Aristotelian context of man as a rational animal.
If the reader were to accept reading nāṭiq as “rational”, “possessing logic”, numerous difficult
questions are raised about the nature of animals as discussed elsewhere in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, for
example the beginning of chapter 10 on the faculties of the soul:136

ِ
س امللموس مثل اْلرارة
ّ  مث من بعد ذلك القوة اليت ِّبا حي.فاذا حدث اإلنسان فأول ما حيدث فيه القوة اليت ِّبا يتغ ّذى وهي القوة الغاذية
حيس األلوان واملبصرات كلها مثل
ّ  واليت ِّبا،حيس األصوات
ّ  واليت ِّبا،حيس الروائح
ّ  واليت ِّبا،حيس الطعوم
ّ  واليت ِّبا،والربودة وسائرها
.حيسه فيشتاقه أو يكرهه
ّ الشعاعات وحيدث مع اْلو
ّ اس قوة أخرى ِّبا نزوع إىل ما
Once a person exists, the first thing to arise in him is the faculty by which he takes nourishment,
namely the nutritive faculty. Then there arises the faculty by which he senses the tangible, such
as heat, cold and other tangibles, and the faculty by which he senses tastes, that by which he
senses smells, that by which he senses sounds, and that by which he senses colours and all seen
things such as rays of light. With the senses another faculty arises, the appetition137 for him to
yearn for or hate what he perceives.
This initial discussion of faculties is significant for us because it demonstrates some further
necessary commonalities between humans and animals. Animals must also have the nutritive
faculty, because otherwise they would starve. The intriguing question here is how animals can be
said to yearn for or hate things, or indeed to perceive taste, smell or sound in the way that the
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word might commonly be understood.138 It also might occur to the reader that, since plants also
necessarily take nourishment in order to survive, they also have the nutritive faculty. Surely a
creature which is not rational perceives taste and so on in a different way from humans, who are
rational. Thus we can call into question the idea that nāṭiq is used to mean “rational”.
This passage begs more questions than it answers if we accept nāṭiq to be understood as “rational”,
because the reader might wonder how to reconcile animals not being rational with the fact that
they must also have the nutritive faculty. One also wonders what causes yearning or hatred, that is
to say how a person – or an animal – decides what is yearned for and what is hated. A possible
answer would be that this is fiṭra, primordial human nature.139
Reproduction, said to be subordinate to the nutritive faculty, is also a function in common between
humans and animals. We read in chapter 12 on the organs of reproduction:140

 واخلادمة يف أعضاء التوليد والقوة اليت ِّبا يكون التوليد، والرئيسة منها يف القلب.والقوة اليت ِّبا يكون التوليد منها رئيسة ومنها خادمة
ِ
املادة إىل أن حتصل
ّ  واألخرى تعطي صورة ذلك النوع من اْليوان وحترك،املادة اليت ِّبا يكون اْليوان الذي له تلك القوة
ّ  إحدامها تُع ّد،اثنتان
.هلا تلك الصورة
The faculty by which generation occurs is partly ruling and partly serving. The ruling part is in
the heart, and the serving part in the organs of generation. The faculty by which generation
occurs is twofold: one prepares the matter by which animals which have that faculty exist, and
the other gives the form of that type of animal and moves the matter that it might attain that
form.
Here al-Fārābī tells us that at least some animals have the faculty by which generation occurs.
While the writer does concern himself in chapter 12 mainly with human beings and how they
reproduce, it follows from this passage that animals and humans have in common subordinate
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aspects of at least one of the faculties of the soul, in this case the nutritive faculty, as well as the
faculty itself.
Walzer claims that this passage and chapter 12 generally are based on Aristotle’s On the Generation
of Animals.141 The problem with this is that he presupposes the existence of a comprehensive
edition of all the psychological and biological writings of Aristotle, and that such an edition – if it
existed – was available to and used by al-Fārābī. This is not impossible, but it is more likely that alFārābī sourced his ideas here about twofold generation from his own perceptions and studies, or
indeed from the Qurʾān:142

ِ ْ وِمن ُك هل َشيء َخلَ ْقنَا َزْو َج
ي لَ َعل ُك ْم تَ َذكُرو َن
َ
ْ
And of all things We created two of a pair, that you might remember.
The idea that generation is twofold can be seen to stem in part from the Qurʾān. Whether al-Fārābī
had this particular verse in mind when writing al-Madīna al-fāḍila cannot be known for certain, but
the idea that he used verses from the Qurʾān in forming his philosophy would seem to be a more
reasonable assumption than that he used a compilation of Aristotle which is not known to have
existed, been translated or been accessible to al-Fārābī. Even if it did, we know that the idea of
twofold generation does not occur anywhere in On the Generation of Animals.143 For these reasons,
it is more likely that al-Fārābī either came up with the idea of the faculty of generation by twofold
by himself or from another source, or understood this Qurʾānic verse as referring specifically to the
generation of animals and humans.
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Al-Fārābī compares the violence of animals with that of flawed human beings in chapter 18, on the
views of pagan and erring states. He describes the views of these flawed states as making a
comparison with nature in order to justify their actions:144

 كأنّه قد طُبِ َع،فإذا نرى كثريا من اْليوان يثب على كثري من باقيها فيلتمس إفسادها وإبطاهلا من غري أن ينتفع بشيء من ذلك نفعا يظهر
ضارا له وإن مل يكن منه شيء
على أن ال يكون
ُ
ّ ضار له على أن ََي َعل وجود غريه
ّ  أو أن وجود كل ما سواه،غريه
َ املوجود يف العامل بأسره
،وجعِل كل نوع من كل نوع ِّبذه اْلال
ُ ،غريه فيما ينفعه
َ  مث كل واحد منها إن مل يرم ذلك التمس أن يستعبد.آخر غري أنه موجود فقط
.ويف كثري منها ُجعِل كل شخص من كل شخص من نوعه ِّبذه اْلال
We see many animals attacking other animals. They seek to ruin and destroy them without
gaining any apparent benefit from it, as if it were designed by nature that nothing else should
exist in the world except this animal, or that the existence of other animals should be seen as
harmful, its very existence being arranged with this purpose in view, although there is actually
no harm in the other animal except its existence alone. Then even if the other animals do not
have this intention, it tries regardless to enslave others insofar as it might use them. This is the
way in which the relation between the different species is arranged, and in many cases the
relation of different individuals of one and the same species is arranged in the same way.
This important passage sees al-Fārābī criticise the citizens of flawed states by comparing them with
animals.145 That such things which are so remarkably similar to human nature occur in the animal
kingdom does not mean that humans ought to embrace their base desires to conquer and do
violence. To do so would be to abandon the true human quest for perfection, which is happiness
according to al-Fārābī. The souls of the inhabitants of the flawed states do not have the rational
faculty, or the rational faculty is not effectively used, and so they are destroyed after death. In a
sense, flawed humans regress to the point of animals by refusing to accept rationalism.146
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Aristotle on Animals and al-Fārābī’s Alterations
One of the more important general differences between Aristotle and al-Fārābī on animals is that
the former never used comparisons between human and animal behaviour in order to make points
about the afterlife and politics. Al-Fārābī used this kind of analogy in order to demonstrate the
serious errors of flawed states, whereas the political context of Aristotle’s era may have made this
more difficult, or indeed Aristotle may not have wished to equate even flawed humans, who still
have moral culpability, with animals. An intertextual study of Aristotle and al-Fārābī demonstrates
that the former’s influence on the latter is overstated, and indeed that in many key areas of alMadīna al-fāḍila there is no sense that al-Fārābī gave any particular attention to Aristotle.
The definition of man as a “rational animal”, although often attributed to Aristotle by his
commentators and modern scholars, does not occur anywhere in the surviving texts of Aristotle.
The usual location given for the phrase is Metaphysics 7.1037b, but this passage deals with defining
man as a “two-footed animal” rather than a “rational animal”.147 The closest Aristotle came to this
phrase was in Nicomachean Ethics 1102a when he talks about rational and irrational parts of the
soul:

Now on the subject of psychology some of the teaching current in extraneous discourses is
satisfactory, and may be adopted here: namely that the soul consists of two parts, one irrational
and the other capable of reason.148 Whether these two parts are really distinct in the sense that
the parts of the body or of any other divisible whole are distinct, or whether though
distinguishable in thought as two they are inseparable in reality, like the convex and concave
sides of a curve, is a question of no importance for the matter in hand. Of the irrational part of
the soul again one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature:
I refer to the part that causes nutrition and growth […] 149
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τὸ ζῷον δίπουν, to zōon dipoun.
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We understand that al-Fārābī may have used this passage when formulating his own ideas on the
faculties of the soul, as Aristotle also says that it is part of the soul, common to all living things,
which causes nutrition. Worth noting, however, is that al-Fārābī called the faculties of the soul five
in number: he did not simply split the social into rational and irrational parts.
Even so, the initial description of the faculties of the soul in al-Madīna al-fāḍila still seems similar to
conventional Peripatetic philosophy,150 at least with regard to the inference that the nutritive
faculty belonging to all living creatures. It is the particular terms which al-Fārābī used within this
description, however, which cast doubt upon the idea that he simply copied Aristotle and his
commentators. This is because words like nuṭq and its derived forms do not necessarily conform to
Greek logos, which is difficult to pin down to a specific translation. If al-Fārābī really did intend that
al-ḥayawān an-nāṭiq be understood as “the rational animal”, one wonders why he did not select a
word such as ʿaqlāni, manṭiqī, ʿāqil or simply ʿaqlī instead of nāṭiq. We also need to remember that
Aristotle himself never defined man as a “rational animal” in his books: the first to use this phrase,
although in a slightly different form, was Porphyry who called man a “mortal rational animal”.151
Al-Fārābī may not have wished that al-ḥayawān an-nāṭiq be understood as “the rational animal”
because of a deliberate decision on his part. Based on the consistent use of nāṭiq and other forms
based on this root in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, we can suggest that the writer intended us to understand
consistently such derived forms according to their common meaning of speech. Al-Fārābī used
speech in al-Madīna al-fāḍila to differentiate between animals and man, and rational thought to
differentiate between correct and incorrect human behaviour.152

περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔοικε
κοινῷ καὶ φυτικῷ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τρέφεσθαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι […]
150
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Brief mention can be made of Aristotle’s attitude towards slavery and his defence of it. Aristotle
considered slaves to be a separate category from both animals and humans, as he stated in his
Nicomachean Ethics:153

[…] friendship does not exist towards things without souls, nor is it an even [i.e. proportionate]
thing. Nor does it exist towards a horse or an ox, towards a slave or as a slave, for it has nothing
in common with these things. A slave is a tool with a soul, just as a tool is a slave without a
soul.154
Al-Fārābī would have disagreed. He does not say anywhere in al-Madīna al-fāḍila that slaves are
reduced to subhuman status because of their being slaves, nor does he compare slaves with
animals. He actually criticises the practice by attacking the citizens of flawed states which compare
their actions to those of animals in order to justify violence against others and enslavement of
other people.155 It is instructive to compare Bogomolov’s analysis of the social context of ancient
philosophy,156 which may help us to understand the origin of Aristotle’s ideas on slavery more fully.
That said, al-Fārābī lived in a society which had also been marked by its active use of slave
labour.157 The Zanj rebellion was finally crushed after a long campaign only ten years after alFārābī’s birth, so it is difficult to believe that he was not aware of the debate about slaves and their
status in society when he was in Baghdad – and yet there is no sense in al-Madīna al-fāḍila that
slaves are subhuman, nor is there any attempt at justifying of the practice of keeping slaves.
Differing opinions on slavery between Aristotle and al-Fārābī cannot be reduced purely to the
differing societal contexts of their work.
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1161b
[…] φιλία δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς
δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν: ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ᾽ ὄργανον
ἄψυχος δοῦλος.
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Fiṭra in the Text and Comparison with the Qurʾān
There are many possible ways of translating the Qurʾānic term fiṭra, from the simple including
“creation”, “nature”, “disposition” and so on,158 to the more complex such as “a kind or way of
creating or of being created”.159 “Primordial human nature” is generally a good fit for al-Madīna alfāḍila because it is usually applied to human beings. The first mention of this term occurs towards
the start of al-Fārābī’s description of the ideal ruler:160
] ال ميكن أن يكون اإلنسان ينال الكمال الذي ألجله ُجعلت له الفطرة الطبيعية إال باجتماعات مجاعة كثرية متعاوني يقوم كل واحد لكل واحد...[
]...[ ببعض ما حيتاج إليه

[…] a person cannot attain the perfection for whose sake his natural disposition was made for
him unless many co-operating societies come together and each supply the other with what they
need […]
In this case we can see that the word fiṭra is applied specifically to human beings. What is
significant, though, is that the person’s natural disposition is said to have been made for him: he
does not make it for himself. The reader would likely infer that it is God who made fiṭra for the
person, because God is the First Cause who, ultimately, made everything. Aristotle did not use such
a term as fiṭra in On the Soul or in any of his other works, necessarily because, for him, there was
no personal God who might design people’s dispositions. Walzer argues161 that fiṭra was selected
here because it contrasts with other words which make divine providence clearer – we can call this
statement into question because of the Qurʾānic origin of the term, and the way in which al-Fārābī
uses it.
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Part of the originality of al-Fārābī’s writing is manifest in his inclination to modify the scope of
usage of the word fiṭra. When discussing the perfect state, the writer compares its organs with
those of humans who rule and serve:162
]...[ كذلك املدينة أجزاؤها خمتلفة الفطر متفاضلة اهليئات

Thus the state: its parts are of different natures, and their natural dispositions are unequal in
excellence [...]
It is important that fiṭra is also applied to the institutions of the state, because this helps us
understand who created the pefect state: God. God gives fiṭra to people and things, and it is a
recurring idea in al-Madīna al-fāḍila that faith in God and knowledge of revelation are required for
the perfect state to be so. Al-Fārābī is different from Aristotle in this area because the latter did not
claim divine creation and design of the functions of the state.
Let us now turn to the Qurʾān and consider some important verses which include the word fiṭra and
derived forms from this root. Perhaps the most significant is its occurrence as an active verb,
faṭara:163

ِِ
ِ
ِ
ِ ت وٱألَر
ِ
ي
َ ض َحنيفا َوَمآ أَنَاْ م َن ٱلْ ُم ْش ِرك
ُ إِ هين َوج ْه
َ ْ َ ت َو ْج ِه َي للذي فَطََر ٱلس َم َو
Truly I have set my face towards Him who created the Heavens and the Earth, and I am not
among those who associate partners with God.
Thus we can understand that there is a clear Qurʾānic precedent for the word fiṭra being used of
God’s actions in creating things.164 Al-Fārābī took this term from the Qurʾān and used it as part of
his philosophy in order to make his points clearer, which means that such points can be contrasted
with Aristotle, who did not write about a concept related to fiṭra.
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One other prominent example of faṭara can be cited, this time occurring in the context of exhorting
humans to attempt to follow the fiṭra by which God created them:165

ِ
ِ فَأَقِم وجهك لِلدهي ِن حنِيفا فِطْرت ٱلل ِه ٱل ِيت فَطَر ٱلناس علَي ها الَ تَب ِد
ِ هين ٱلْ َقيه ُم َولَ ِكن أَ ْكثَ َر ٱلن
اس الَ يَ ْعلَ ُمو َن
َ يل خلَْل ِق ٱلل ِه َذل
َ َْ َ ْ
ََ
َ
ُ ك ٱلد
َ ْ َْ َ َ َ
So set your face to the religion, a man of pure faith - the disposition by which God created
people. Let there be no change to the creation of God. That is the straight religion, but most
people know not.
The idea of many humans not understanding the truth is also common in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, which
might lead one to suggest that al-Fārābī found it in the Qurʾān and used it in his philosophy because
of its presence in the Book. The significance of this passage is that it refers to the disposition by
which God created people. It seems possible that al-Fārābī named one of the functions of this
disposition as perfection and that he had this verse in mind when writing about how mankind was
made with the inclination to seek perfection in al-Madīna al-fāḍila.166

165
166

Ar-Rūm (30): 30
IV, 13, §5, quoted and analysed above pp34-35

52

Conclusion
Based on the evidence in al-Madīna al-fāḍila, it is difficult to reduce al-Fārābī to a pure Aristotelian
who was devoid of religious influence or original ideas. While his philosophy is not completely new,
it is in its detail that we find his originality and tendency to view the truth, as he saw it, as being
more important in itself than who said it. Challenging the notion that Aristotle’s legacy dominated
al-Fārābī’s work in one particular book could also lead us to analyse his other books afresh,
disarmed of the preconceived notion that all he really did was copy and preserve ancient Greek
philosophy.
From his highly-developed description of the First Cause to his new ideas about the nature of
animals, as well as his emphasis on the importance of faith and revelation in the perfect state, alFārābī made his ideas suited to his times and practical in dealing with the political, philosophic and
theological questions of the Islamic Golden Age. That said, there are commonalities between the
social context of al-Fārābī and that of Aristotle – the difference between them is chiefly the
presence of revealed religion. By understanding this point, we can also come to question other
long-held views about al-Fārābī’s oeuvre. Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikma has often been dismissed in modern times
as either misattributed to al-Fārābī or unimportant because of its being understood in the wrong
context. Approaching such works from the point of view of the writer’s original thought and Muslim
beliefs may yield results as to the possible mystical beliefs of al-Fārābī, and it would certainly allow
us to re-open the book on his place in history.
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